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Summary
This paper presents a novel scheme for diagnosis of faults affecting sensors that
measure the satellite attitude, body angular velocity, flywheel spin rates, and
defects in control torques from reaction wheel motors. The proposed method-
ology uses adaptive observers to provide fault estimates that aid detection,
isolation, and estimation of possible actuator and sensor faults. The adaptive
observers do not need a priori information about fault internalmodels. A nonlin-
ear geometric approach is used to avoid that aerodynamic disturbance torques
have unwanted influence on the fault estimates. An augmented high-fidelity
spacecraft model is exploited during design and validation to replicate faults.
This simulationmodel includes disturbance torques as experienced in lowEarth
orbits. This paper includes an analysis to assess robustness properties of the
method with respect to parameter uncertainties and disturbances. The results
document the efficacy of the suggested methodology.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The increasing operational requirements for onboard autonomy in satellite control systems imply an inherent need for
structural methods that support the design of complete and reliable supervisory systems. It is necessary to design supervi-
sion schemes that are capable of realising accurate diagnosis of potential faults to allow subsequent fault accommodation
actions to improve system reliability and availability, while maintaining desirable performances. In this context, fault
detection and diagnosis (FDD) systems provide fundamental information about the health status of the system jointly
with the estimation of any faults.
Significant research in FDD has been done in last 3 decades1,2 and numerous model-based methods have been
proposed.3,4 For a nonlinear spacecraft, linearmodels fall short, so nonlinear approaches are needed.5,6 The nonlinear geo-
metric approach (NLGA)7 was inspired by the fault detection and isolation (FDI) problem for spacecraft. Later research8-10
investigated FDI and FDDmethods for spacecraft, and some included supervisory actions to mitigate faults. Specifically,
Baldi et al11 considered faults in reaction wheel control torque and in wheel spin rate sensors, andMattone and De Luca12
mapped physical faults to models that were affine with respect to actuator and sensor faults. The FDI task was carried out
in other works11,13 through cross-checking of residual signals, and actuator and sensor fault estimates were provided by
dedicated estimation filters using radial basis function neural networks. This approach was quite complex, and robust-
ness properties were not investigated. The majority of results in spacecraft FDD literature focus on occurrence of either
actuator or sensor defects separately, (see, eg, other works14-16) or take into account the possible occurrence of a more
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limited number of actuator and sensor faults; at the same time, amore holistic view is needed on diagnosis and operability
of the entire attitude determination and control system (ADCS).
This paper aims to assess the health condition and proper functioning of all essential sensors and actuators used in a
spacecraft ADCS. In particular, the sensors measuring the satellite attitude, body angular velocity, and flywheel spin rates
are considered,whereas the actuators are the reactionwheelmotors. Thiswork represents a substantial improvement over
previous works of the authors.11,13 Reduction in complexity is achieved by a structure where fault estimates from adaptive
observers (AOs) are used as diagnostic signals for all of the fault detection, isolation and estimation tasks. Step-stones in
the design are based on the general works of Zhang et al17 and Jiang et al.18 One is to augment models for the design of
AOs for sensor fault estimation, such that actual output sensor faults are represented as input signals.19 The second is
the design of AOs for actuator and sensor fault estimation. The third is to employ the NLGA7 to obtain diagnostic signals
that are independent of the knowledge of the aerodynamic disturbance parameters and decoupled from different subsets
of faults. The fourth is to achieve fault isolation through the use of a cross-check of the diagnostic signals and a proper
decision logic.
Albeit being based on existing theoretical approaches, this paper describes a novel application scheme with significant
benefits. The joint use of the NLGA and AOs allows to take advantage of the benefits of both of them. The use of AOs
allows to design generalised fault estimation filters, which do not need a priori information about the type of fault. The
FDD AOs can accurately estimate a generic fault without needing to define any specific fault internal model. The NLGA
allows to obtain better FDI performances and accurate fault estimates, independent of the knowledge of the aerodynamic
disturbance parameters and thus without any isolation and estimation error due to aerodynamic parameter uncertainties.
The structural analysis (SA) method, which is illustrated in the work of Blanke et al,1 and already suggested for satellite
applications, eg, in the works of Izadi-Zamanabadi and Larsen20 and Lorentzen et al,21 is exploited to qualitatively assess
detectability and isolability of faults related to the satellite attitude control system (ACS). This satellite-wide analysis of
the ADCS will show that a second physical attitude sensor is required to achieve a complete isolation of possible attitude
and angular velocity sensor faults.
The proposed scheme relies on general satellite and reactionwheel dynamicmodels and a very limited sensor hardware
redundancy and exploits only sensors and models that are fundamental for the ADCS. No additional subsystem models
or embedded measurement sensors, eg, current or voltage sensors, are required to achieve a complete FDD. Moreover,
in practice, it is normal and usually required for safety and reliability reasons to have hardware redundancy available for
both for satellite actuators and sensor systems.
This paper evaluates the performance of the proposed FDD system using a detailed nonlinear satellite simulator with
detailed flywheelmodeling,22 measurement noise, and exogenous disturbance signals. In particular, the exogenous distur-
bance terms are represented by aerodynamic and gravitational disturbance torques. Simulation results show various fault
cases. An extensive Monte-Carlo analysis is conducted to assess the robustness and reliability of the proposed diagnosis
scheme with respect to parametric uncertainties.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the overall spacecraft and reaction wheel models. Section 3 illus-
trates the SA of the actuator and sensor fault detectability and isolability. Section 4 illustrates the augmented spacecraft
model. Section 5 illustrates the design of the FDD system, which is based on NLGA and AOs. Section 6 illustrates the pro-
posed procedure for the cross-checking of the diagnostic signals and the detection and isolation of the actuator or sensor
faults. Section 7 provides simulation results. Concluding remarks are finally drawn in Section 8.
2 SPACECRAFT AND ACTUATOR MODELS
2.1 Dynamic and kinematic equations
The spacecraft is considered as a rigid body whose attitude is represented by using the quaternion notation. The satellite
mathematical model is given by the dynamic and kinematic equations of (1) and (2),23,24 where 𝜔in = [𝜔1, 𝜔2, 𝜔3]Tin is
the vector of body rates in roll, pitch, and yaw with respect to the inertial reference frame, respectively, whilst hrw =
[hrw,1, hrw,2, hrw,3, hrw,4]T is the vector of the flywheel angular momenta. The quaternion vector qorb = [q1, q2, q3, q4]Torb
describes the attitude of the spacecraft with respect to the orbital reference frame. The principal inertia body-fixed frame
is considered, with Ixx, Iyy, and Izz the elements on the main diagonal of the satellite inertia matrix Is. Thus,
?̇?in = −I−1s S(Is𝝎in + Trwhrw) + I−1s
(
−Trwḣrw +Mgg +Maero
)
(1)
q̇orb = 12Ωqorb (2)
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with the skew-symmetric matrices
S(𝜔in) =
[ 0 −𝜔3 𝜔2
𝜔3 0 −𝜔1
−𝜔2 𝜔1 0
]
in
, Ω(𝜔orb) =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 𝜔3 −𝜔2 𝜔1
−𝜔3 0 𝜔1 𝜔2
𝜔2 −𝜔1 0 𝜔3
−𝜔1 −𝜔2 −𝜔3 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦orb
. (3)
The relations between the spacecraft angular rates 𝜔in = [𝜔1, 𝜔2, 𝜔3]Tin and 𝜔orb = [𝜔1, 𝜔2, 𝜔3]
T
orb, respectively, expressed
with respect to the inertial and orbital frames, are given by[
𝜔1
𝜔2
𝜔3
]
orb
=
[
𝜔1
𝜔2
𝜔3
]
in
+ 𝜔0
[ 2(q1q2 + q3q4)(
1 − 2q21 − 2q23
)
2(q2q3 − q1q4)
]
, (4)
where 𝜔0 =
√
𝜇∕R3 is the orbital angular velocity of the spacecraft. Therefore, it results that the dynamic equations of
(1) describe the spacecraft dynamics with respect to the inertial reference frame, whilst the kinematic equations of (2)
describe the attitude kinematics with respect to the orbital reference frame. The inertial and orbital notations for the
spacecraft angular velocity and attitude, respectively, will be neglected in the rest of this paper.
The external disturbances, which can be cyclic or constant, consist of aerodynamic effects, gravity gradient, mag-
netic moment, and solar effects. In this paper, the design of the FDD system exploits the explicit decoupling only of the
aerodynamic torque for the following reasons.
• The gravity is always present and, in many cases, produces a disturbance torque at least one order of magnitude larger
than other external torques (eg, Galileo and Voyager 1 and 2). However, its model is almost perfectly known, and thus
its effect does not need to be decoupled.
• Many low Earth orbit (LEO) spacecrafts are not subject to significant solar disturbance torques.
• It is desirable to have a spacecraft with no on-board residual magnetic field that affects attitude; however, there are
cases in which magnetic actuators are used for attitude control purpose (control torque is known).
The dynamic equations (1) explicitly include the gyroscopic terms due to cross-couplings between the satellite angular
rates and flywheel spin rates and the models of the gravitational and aerodynamic disturbance torques Mgg and Maero
about the centre of mass and described in the body-fixed frame. Both the disturbances are dependent on the satellite
attitude. As already remarked, these disturbances typically represent the most important external disturbance torques
affecting LEO satellites.23,24
Regarding the gravity gradient torque Mgg, the parameters 𝜇 and R in (5) represent the gravitational constant and
the orbit radius, respectively. R is the satellite distance from the Earth center and v̂nadir is the unit vector towards nadir
expressed in body-frame coordinates
Mgg =
3𝜇
R3
(v̂nadir × Isv̂nadir) =
3𝜇
R3
⎡⎢⎢⎣
2 (Izz − I𝑦𝑦) (q2q3 + q1q4)
(
1 − 2q21 − 2q22
)
2 (Ixx − Izz) (q1q3 − q2q4)
(
1 − 2q21 − 2q22
)
4 (I𝑦𝑦 − Ixx) (q1q3 − q2q4) (q2q3 + q1q4)
⎤⎥⎥⎦ . (5)
Regarding the aerodynamic torqueMaero, it depends on the aerodynamic force represented in (6) by the relation Faero =
1
2 𝜌S𝑝V
2CD, where 𝜌 is the atmospheric density, V is the relative velocity of the satellite, Sp is the reference area affected
by the aerodynamic flux, and CD is the drag coefficient. rcp = [rxcp , r𝑦cp , rzcp]T is the vector joining the centre of mass and
the aerodynamic centre of pressure and v̂V is the unit velocity vector expressed in body-frame coordinates. Mainly due
to the presence of the unknown terms 𝜌 and CD, the input signalMaero in (1) represents the main source of uncertainty.
Therefore, the AOs need to be independent of the aerodynamic disturbance. The aerodynamic torque is
Maero = Faero
(
v̂V × rcp
)
= 12𝜌S𝑝V
2CD
⎡⎢⎢⎣
2 (q1q3 + q2q4)r𝑦cp − 2 (q1q2 − q3q4)rzcp(
1 − 2q22 − 2q
2
3
)
rzcp − 2 (q1q3 + q2q4)rxcp
2 (q1q2 − q3q4)rxcp −
(
1 − 2q22 − 2q
2
3
)
r𝑦cp
⎤⎥⎥⎦ . (6)
The considered satellite ACS consists of a fixed array of 4 reaction wheels in a tetrahedral configuration defined by the
matrix Trw
Trw =
⎡⎢⎢⎣
1∕
√
3 1∕
√
3 −1∕
√
3 −1∕
√
3√
2∕3 −
√
2∕3 0 0
0 0 −
√
2∕3
√
2∕3
⎤⎥⎥⎦ . (7)
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The dynamic equations of the detailed reaction wheel models are given in (8), where hrw = Irw𝜔rw = [hrw,1, hrw,2,
hrw,3, hrw,4]T is the vector of the wheel angular momenta, 𝜔rw = [𝜔rw,1, 𝜔rw,2, 𝜔rw,3, 𝜔rw,4]T is the vector of the reac-
tion wheel spin rates, Irw denotes the flywheel inertia, and b and c are the viscous and Coulomb friction coefficients,
respectively22
?̇?rw = I −1rw ḣrw = I −1rw Mrw − I −1rw b 𝜔rw − I −1rw c sgn𝜔rw. (8)
The elements of the input vectoru = Mrw = [M1, M2, M3, M4]T correspond to the control torques actuated by the reaction
wheel motors.
The overall system model can be described by (1), (2), and (8). Thus, the overall state vector can be represented by
x = [𝜔1, 𝜔2, 𝜔3, q1, q2, q3, q4, 𝜔rw,1, 𝜔rw,2, 𝜔rw,3, 𝜔rw,4]T , and all the state variables are assumed to be measurable.
2.2 Actuator and sensor fault modelling
The occurrence of possible faults affecting the actuated attitude control torques, the flywheel spin rate, satellite attitude,
and angular velocity measurements is considered in this paper. Moreover, it is assumed that, at most, 1 fault can affect the
system at any time. However, it is worth observing that the designed fault diagnosis system is able to detect, isolate, and
estimate any occurred actuator or sensor fault at any time without needing any reconfiguration of the diagnosis system
on the basis of the considered fault. Being (1) and (8) already affine in the control inputs, the ith physical actuator fault
can be simply modeled through the following additive fault input:
𝑓Mi = Mi −Mc,i, (i = 1, … , 4), (9)
where Mc represents the vector of the commanded control inputs. Regarding the sensor faults, the measurement faults
can be defined as the differences between the real values 𝜔rw, j, 𝜔l, and qm and measured values 𝜔rw𝑦,𝑗 , 𝜔y,l, and qy,m of the
jth flywheel spin rate; lth satellite angular velocity; andmth quaternion component, respectively
𝑓𝜔rw,𝑗 = 𝜔rw𝑦,𝑗 − 𝜔rw,𝑗 ( 𝑗 = 1, … , 4)
𝑓𝜔l = 𝜔𝑦,l − 𝜔l (l = 1, … , 3)
𝑓qm = q𝑦,m − qm (m = 1, … , 4).
(10)
Physical attitude sensor faults generally can have an effect on all the components of the provided quaternion vectors
simultaneously, thus each physical attitude sensor fault is actually considered as a single additive fault vector fq =
[𝑓q1 , 𝑓q2 , 𝑓q3 , 𝑓q4]T affecting the measurement of the quaternion vector q in the rest of this paper.
The presence of fault terms in the output equations of the system does not allow the direct exploitation of the NLGA
as described in the work of De Persis and Isidori.7 However, the exploitation of an augmented model, as described in the
work of Zhang et al17 and in the following Section 4, allows to represent the actual output sensor faults as input faults in
the augmented model and subsequently makes the system model suitable for the exploitation of the NLGA.
In this paper, only additive fault representations are considered due to the requirement of nonlinear system models
affine both in the inputs and faults for the exploitation of the NLGA. Themultiplicative model is, usually, a natural way to
model a wide variety of sensor and actuator faults but cannot be used to represent more general component faults.25 On
the other hand, the additive faults representation is more general than the multiplicative one and can be used to model
a wide class of faults, including sensor, actuator, and component faults.25 In addition, the additive faults representation
is more suitable for the design of FDI/FDD schemes because the faults are represented by signals rather than by changes
in the dynamic model of the system, as is the case with the multiplicative representation. Finally, for actuator faults, the
equivalent multiplicative fault magnitude is needed for controller redesign, and this involves that actuator command is
available. However, for actuator fault mitigation, we often choose to disregard actuators with faults and mitigate using
remaining healthy actuators. The latter approach is fully supported by the diagnosis presented in this paper.Multiplicative
faults can always be modelled in an equivalent but additive form. Both additive and multiplicative fault representations
can be equivalently exploited to model a wide variety of abrupt, incipient, intermittent actuator, and sensor faults due to
different causes (eg, mechanical, electrical, thermal, magnetic causes, etc).
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3 STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF FAULT DETECTABILITY AND ISOLABILITY
Before startingwith the design of the fault diagnosis system, it is worth observing that the availability of 2 different attitude
sensors has been actually considered in this work. This hardware redundancy is necessary for the complete sensor fault
isolability and comes as outcome of the application of fault detectability and isolability study to the considered fault
scenarios. An SA has been performed as illustrated in the work of Blanke et al.1 For a comprehensive detailed application
of the SA, refer to the work of the aforementioned author.1
The SA has be applied to the spacecraft model (13), which can be interpreted as a set of constraints (ie, a set of nom-
inal input-output relations), to define a structure graph describing the direct interactions among the signals within the
dynamical system and independently of the nature of these constraints. This graph gives a qualitative representation of
the links between constraints and the variables and parameters occurring in each constraint and allows to analyse the
redundancies within the system, which can be exploited for fault diagnosis.
The behavioural model of a system is defined by a pair  = (,), where  = {z1, z2, … , zN} is a set of variables and
parameters and  = {c1, c2, … , cM} is a set of constraints describing the relations among the variables. The structural
model of the system  = (,) is a bipartite graph  = (,, ), where  ⊂  ×  is the set of edges (ci, z𝑗) ∈  if the
variable zj appears in the constraint ci. In this undirected graph, all the variables and parameters z𝑗 ∈  that are connected
with a given constraint vertex ci ∈  have to satisfy the equation or rule that this constraint vertex represents.
The system variables and parameters  can be classified as known and unknown ones. Unknown variables  are not
directly measured, though there might exist some way to compute their value from the values of known variables .
Similarly, the set of constraints  can be partitioned into the subsets of constraints , which link only known variables,
and  , in which at least one unknown variable appears.
The basic tool for the SA concerning fault detectability and isolability is the concept of matching in bipartite graphs
 = (,, ). A matching is a causal assignment, ie, the introduction of some orientations of the originally undirected
structure graph edges, which associate with every unknown system variable of  , a constraint that can be used to deter-
mine the variable assuming the other variables of  to be known. Unknown variables that do not appear in a matching
cannot be calculated, whereas variables that can be matched in several ways can be determined in different (redundant)
ways. The last situation provides a means for FDI. A matching is called complete with respect to  if it has cardinality|| = ||, whilst it is called complete with respect to  if || = ||. For a matching that is complete with respect to
, each constraint belongs to exactly 1 edge of the matching
∀c ∈  ∶ ∃x ∈  such that (c, x) ∈. (11)
Similarly, for a matching that is complete with respect to  , every variable belongs to an edge
∀x ∈  ∶ ∃c ∈  such that (c, x) ∈. (12)
A graph = (,, ) is called over-constrained if there is a completematching on the variables but not on the constraints
, just-constrained if there is a complete matching on the variables  and on the constraints , and under-constrained if
there is a complete matching on the constraints  but not on the variables  .
As illustrated in the work of Blanke et al,1 a system is said to be structurally diagnosable or monitorable if it is possible
to test whether the system constraints are satisfied or not. The analysis of system monitorability and the FDI algorithms
are based on analytical redundancy relations (ARRs), which become available when there are constraints that are not
needed tomatch the unknown variables in a system and some redundant information exists. These additional constraints
and all others need be satisfied when the system operates according to its normal operation behaviour.
It is clear that ARRs can be defined only for over-constrained graphs, ie, -complete matchings because such match-
ings show a way to determine all the unknown variables of the system. The redundancy relations are identified as the
unmatched constraints in which all the unknown variables have been matched, and subsequently, the relations are
expressed by known variables through backtracking to known variables, according to the matching.
Considering the occurrence of actuator or flywheel spin rate sensor faults 𝑓Mi and 𝑓𝜔rw,i (i = 1, … , 4), each reaction
wheel can be considered as a distinct subsystem. The obtainable graphs i = (i,i, i) (i = 1, … , 4) corresponding to
the reaction wheel model equations (8) result to be over-constrained since the matching is complete on the unknown
variables i but not on the constraints i, ie, |i| = |i| ≤ |i|. Therefore, it would be possible to define a distinct ARR
for each reaction wheel subsystem from the resulting unmatched constraints.
However, since both actuator and sensor faults 𝑓Mi and 𝑓𝜔rw,i affecting the ith reaction wheel subsystem are considered
in this paper, it would not be possible to obtain the complete fault isolation only by means of these ARRs but only the
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fault detection when the constraint is violated and the ARR not satisfied. In fact, each ARR results to be sensitive to both
the actuator and sensor faults affecting a specific reaction wheel subsystem.
In order to allow the complete fault isolation, some additional constraints can be introduced to obtain an extended
over-constrained graph by exploiting also the satellite dynamic equations (1). However, since in the considered space-
craft dynamic model (1) the aerodynamic disturbance is characterized by parameters whose actual values are generally
not exactly known, the disturbance term d = 12 𝜌S𝑝V
2CD is considered as an unknown variable. As a consequence, the
constraints associated with Equation (1) could be not satisfied even in case of no faults if the unknown aerodynamic
parameters have actual values different from the assumed nominal ones. These discrepancies might lead to false alarms
in the fault detection procedure. Therefore, the ARRs determined on the basis of these constraints would be not robust
to aerodynamic parameter uncertainties.
As it will be shown in Section 5.4, the exploitation of the NLGA allows to define an additional mathematical variable
xadd, whose dynamic equation
.xadd = 𝑓 (𝜔1, 𝜔2, 𝜔3,q, 𝜔rw,1, 𝜔rw,2, 𝜔rw,3, 𝜔rw,4) is exactly decoupled from the aerodynamic
disturbance and any actuator fault 𝑓Mi (i = 1, … , 4), and generally sensitive to all the sensor faults, including any sensor
fault 𝑓𝜔rw,i (i = 1, … , 4). yadd represents the corresponding output variable. The constraints associated with this new
variable and its dynamic and output equations allow to determine an additional ARR that is robust to the aerodynamic
parameter uncertainties and exploitable for the complete isolation of faults 𝑓Mi or 𝑓𝜔rw,i (i = 1, … , 4) affecting any reaction
wheel subsystem. Since the NLGA variable xadd actually is not sensitive to any actuator fault and sensitive to any flywheel
spin rate sensor fault, only the occurrence of any actual fault 𝑓𝜔rw,i (i = 1, … , 4) results in a violation of the constraints
linked to xadd. The new graph is still over-constrained. Therefore, it would be possible to define 5 structured ARRs from
the resulting unmatched constraints, which allow the complete detection and isolation of any actuator or flywheel spin
rate sensor fault, without the risk of false alarms due to the aerodynamic parameter uncertainties.
On the other hand, considering the occurrence of satellite attitude and angular velocity sensor faults 𝑓𝜔l (l = 1, … , 3)
and fq and the presence of a single attitude sensor, the kinematic equations (2) of the satellite attitude can be considered
in the SA. In this case, the corresponding graph  = (,, ) results to be again over-constrained since the matching is
complete on the unknown variables  but not on the constraints , ie, || = || ≤ ||. Therefore, it would be possible
to define an ARR from the resulting unmatched constraint.
However, since the occurrence of both satellite attitude and angular velocity sensor faults 𝑓𝜔l (l = 1, … , 3) and fq is
now considered, it would not be possible to obtain the fault isolation only by means of a single ARR but only the fault
detection when the constraint is violated and the ARR is not satisfied. In fact, this ARR results to be sensitive to all the
satellite attitude and angular velocity sensor faults 𝑓𝜔l (l = 1, … , 3) and fq.
In order to allow the complete fault isolation, some additional constraints need again to be introduced. In this case, the
equations describing the behaviour of the reaction wheel subsystems cannot be exploited since they are functions only
of the satellite attitude and angular velocities, and thus they are not sensitive to any fault affecting the satellite attitude
or angular velocity sensors. Moreover, the NLGA variable xadd previously introduced for the detection and isolation of
actuator and flywheel spin rate sensor faults cannot be effectively exploited since it leads to an additional ARR that is
actually not satisfied when any sensor fault occurs. Hence, another way to determine additional ARRs to be exploited for
the fault isolation task is necessary.
In order to determine structured ARRs exploitable for the complete isolation of attitude and angular velocity sensor
faults, a 2-step procedure can be used. First, the NLGA can be exploited to determine 9 newmathematical variables xadd,i
(i = 1, … , 9), whose each dynamic equation .xadd,i = 𝑓 (𝜔,q) (i = 1, … , 9) actually results to be decoupled from a specific
angular velocity sensor fault𝑓𝜔l (l = 1, … , 3) and sensitive to the couple of remaining angular velocity sensor faults and to
the attitude sensor fault fq. yadd,i represent the corresponding output variables. Further details about theseNLGAvariables
are given in Section 5.5. The constraints associated with these new variables and their dynamic and output equations
allow to determine ARRs that are structured with respect to the angular velocity sensor faults 𝑓𝜔l (l = 1, … , 3), though
they are still all sensitive to the attitude sensor fault fq. Hence, in case of any angular velocity sensor fault, only a subset
of ARRs is not satisfied, thus allowing to recognize the occurred angular velocity sensor fault. However, an additional
ARR is still required to recognize if an attitude sensor fault or any angular velocity sensor fault actually occurred and thus
obtain the complete fault isolation.
Actually, the only practical way to determine this last ARR consists in the exploitation of some hardware sensor redun-
dancy, which leads to the introduction of additional constraints on the unknown variables. In this paper, the presence of
a redundant attitude sensor is then considered. The attitude measurements of these redundant sensors are represented
in the following by means of 2 different quaternion vectors qy,k (k = 1, 2), which are calculated on the basis of the
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information provided by 2 physical attitude sensors (eg, star trackers). As a consequence, these attitude measurements
can be affected by the corresponding sensor faults fq,k (k = 1, 2).
Again, the corresponding graph  = (,, ) results to be over-constrained since the matching is complete on the
unknown variables  but not on the constraints , ie, || = || ≤ ||. Therefore, exploiting both the NLGA and an
additional hardware attitude sensor redundancy, it is possible to define a sufficient number of ARRs from the result-
ing unmatched constraints, which allow the detection and complete isolation of any possible attitude sensor fault fq,k
(k = 1, 2) affecting 1 of the 2 redundant sensors or any angular velocity sensor fault 𝑓𝜔l (l = 1, … , 3).
4 AUGMENTED NONLINEAR MODEL
The overall nonlinear spacecraft model can be briefly written in the following form:{ .x = n(x) + g(x)u + 𝓁a(x)𝑓a + 𝑝(x)d
𝑦 = h(x) + 𝓁s(x)𝑓s
(13)
in which the state vector is x(t) ∈  (an open subset of n), u(t) ∈ m is the nominal control input vector, 𝑓a(t) ∈ h
and 𝑓s(t) ∈ q are the actuator and sensor fault vectors, respectively, whilst d(t) ∈ r is the disturbance vector, and
𝑦 ∈ 𝑝 is the output vector. n(x), the columns of 𝓁a(x), 𝓁s(x), g(x), and p(x) are smooth vector fields, and h(x) is a smooth
map. In particular, for the complete spacecraft model, embedding also the reaction wheel models, the following vectors
are defined:
x =
[
𝜔1, 𝜔2, 𝜔3, q, 𝜔rw,1, 𝜔rw,2, 𝜔rw,3, 𝜔rw,4
]T
u =
[
Mc,1, Mc,2, Mc,3, Mc,4
]T
d = Faero =
1
2 𝜌S𝑝V
2CD
𝑓a =
[
𝑓M1 , 𝑓M2 , 𝑓M3 , 𝑓M4
]T
𝑓s =
[
𝑓𝜔1 , 𝑓𝜔2 , 𝑓𝜔3 , fq,1, fq,2, 𝑓𝜔rw,1 , 𝑓𝜔rw,2 , 𝑓𝜔rw,3 , 𝑓𝜔rw,4
]T
𝑦 =
[
𝜔𝑦,1, 𝜔𝑦,2, 𝜔𝑦,3, qy,1, qy,2, 𝜔rw,1, 𝜔rw,2, 𝜔rw,3, 𝜔rw,4
]T
(14)
with all the state variables assumed to be measurable,
h(x) = 𝓁s(x) =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
I3 0 0
0 I4 0
0 I4 0
0 0 I4
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ (15)
due to the considered attitude sensor redundancy and the terms n(x), g(x), 𝓁a(x), and p(x) derived from the equations of
(1), (2), and (8).
Considering the approach proposed in the work of Zhang et al17 for the diagnosis of sensor faults, the spacecraft model
can be augmented by adding new state variables z = ∫ t0 𝑦(𝜏)d𝜏 corresponding to the integrated output variables so that.z(t) = h(x) + 𝓁s(x)𝑓s. The augmented system model with the new state variables z and the corresponding new output
variables w is therefore given as
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
.x = n(x) + g(x)u + 𝓁a(x)𝑓a + 𝑝(x)d
.z = h(x) + 𝓁s(x)𝑓s
w = z
(16)
or more synthetically as {
̇̄x = 𝑓 (x̄) + ḡ(x̄)u + 𝓁(x̄)𝑓 + ?̄?(x̄)d
?̄? = w = h̄(x̄),
(17)
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where, for the considered spacecraft model, it results
x̄ =
[
xT , zT
]T
z =
[
z𝜔1 , z𝜔2 , z𝜔3 , zq𝟏 , zq𝟐 , z𝜔rw,1 , z𝜔rw,2 , z𝜔rw,3 , z𝜔rw,4
]T
𝑓 =
[
𝑓Ta , 𝑓
T
s
]T (18)
𝑓 (x̄) =
[
n(x)
h(x)
]
, ḡ(x̄) =
[
g(x)
0
]
, h̄(x̄) =
[
0 I15
]
(19)
𝓁(x̄) =
[
𝓁a(x) 0
0 𝓁s(x)
]
, ?̄?(x̄) =
[
𝑝(x)
0
]
, (20)
where z𝜔l (l = 1, … , 3) and the vectors zqk (k = 1, 2), z𝜔rw, 𝑗 (j = 1, … , 4) correspond to the integrated output variables
∫ t0 𝜔𝑦,l(𝜏)d𝜏, ∫
t
0 qy,k(𝜏)d𝜏, and ∫
t
0 𝜔rw𝑦,𝑗 (𝜏)d𝜏 of the lth satellite angular velocity measurement, kth quaternion vector mea-
surement, and jth flywheel spin rate measurement, respectively. It can be seen that the augmented model (17) of the
spacecraft now results to be affine in all the control inputs and both actuator and sensor fault inputs. Thus, the NLGA can
be exploited to design aerodynamic and fault decoupled AOs also for the sensor fault diagnosis, as described in Section 5.
5 FAULT DIAGNOSIS
5.1 Nonlinear geometric approach
The NLGA was formally developed in the work of De Persis and Isidori,7 and it relies on a coordinate change in the state
and output spaces providing an observable subsystem, which, if it exists, is affected by the fault, but unaffected by distur-
bances and the other faults to be decoupled. TheNLGAestimation filters for FDDare designed by exploiting the properties
of this subsystem. For a comprehensive detailed application of theNLGA, refer to thework of the aforementioned author.7
In particular, the approach consider a generic nonlinear system model in the form{ .x = n(x) + g(x)u + 𝓁(x)𝑓 + 𝑝(x)d
𝑦 = h(x)
(21)
in which the state vector x ∈  (an open subset of 𝓁n), u(t) ∈ 𝓁u is the nominal control input vector, 𝑓 (t) ∈  is
the fault, d(t) ∈ 𝓁d the disturbance vector (including also the faults to be decoupled), and 𝑦 ∈ 𝓁m the output vector.
n(x), 𝓁(x), the columns of g(x) and p(x) are smooth vector fields, and h(x) is a smooth map. Therefore, if P represents the
distribution spanned by the column of p(x), the NLGA method can be devised as follows.7
1. Determine the minimal conditioned invariant distribution containing P (denoted with∑P∗).
2. By using (∑P∗)⟂ (ie, the maximal conditioned invariant codistribution contained in P⟂), determine the largest
observability codistribution contained in P⟂ (denoted with Ω∗).
3. If 𝓁(x) ∉ (Ω∗)⟂, the design procedure can continue; otherwise, the fault is not detectable.
4. Whenever the previous condition is satisfied, it can be found a surjection Ψ1 and a function Φ1 fulfilling Ω∗ ∩
span{dh} = span{d(Ψ1 ◦ h)} and Ω∗ = span{d(Φ1)}, respectively.
The functions Ψ(y) and Φ(x) defined as
Ψ(𝑦) =
(
?̄?1
?̄?2
)
=
(
Ψ1(𝑦)
H2𝑦
)
, Φ(x) =
( x̄1
x̄2
x̄3
)
=
( Φ1(x)
H2h(x)
Φ3(x)
)
(22)
are (local) diffeomorphisms, whereH2 is a selection matrix (ie, a matrix in which any row has all 0 entries but one, which
is equal to 1). x̄1 = Φ1(x) represents the measured part of the state, which is affected by f and not affected by d, whilst x̄2
BALDI ET AL. 9
and x̄3 represent the measured and not measured part of the state, which are affected by f and d. In many cases, x̄3 is not
present. In the new (local) coordinate defined previously, the system is described by the relations⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
̇̄x1 = n1(x̄1, x̄2) + g1(x̄1, x̄2)u + 𝓁1(x̄1, x̄2, x̄3)𝑓
̇̄x2 = n2(x̄1, x̄2, x̄3) + g2(x̄1, x̄2, x̄3)u+
+𝓁2(x̄1, x̄2, x̄3)𝑓 + 𝑝2(x̄1, x̄2, x̄3)d
̇̄x3 = n3(x̄1, x̄2, x̄3) + g3(x̄1, x̄2, x̄3)u+
+𝓁3(x̄1, x̄2, x̄3)𝑓 + 𝑝3(x̄1, x̄2, x̄3)d
?̄?1 = h(x̄1)
?̄?2 = x̄2
(23)
with 𝓁1(x̄1, x̄2, x̄3) ≠ 0 not identically zero. Denoting x̄2 with ?̄?2 and considering it as an independent input, the
x̄1-subsystem, which is affected by the single fault fu and decoupled from the disturbance vector d (embedding also the
other faults to be decoupled), can be defined as follows:{
̇̄x1 = n1(x̄1, ?̄?2) + g1(x̄1, ?̄?2)u + 𝓁1(x̄1, ?̄?2, x̄3)𝑓
?̄?1 = h(x̄1)
(24)
with 𝓁1(x̄1, ?̄?2, x̄3) ≠ 0 not identically zero. This subsystem is exploited for the design of the AOs and residual filters for
fault diagnosis purpose.
5.2 Generic adaptive input fault estimation filter
An AO can be designed for state observation and estimation of generic faults on the basis of the work presented in the
work of Zhang et al.17 Consider a generic nonlinear system described by{
̇̄x(t) = Āx̄(t) + W̄𝑓 (x̄(t), t) + B̄u(t) + D̄𝑓a(t)
?̄?(t) = C̄x̄(t),
(25)
where x̄ ∈ Rn̄, u ∈ Rm̄, and ?̄? ∈ R?̄? denote, respectively, the vector of state variables, inputs and outputs and 𝑓a ∈ Rq̄
is a nonmeasurable vector, which is considered as an additive term resulting from generic input faults. The nonlinear
continuous term 𝑓 (x̄(t), t) ∈ R𝑗 is assumed to be known. Ā ∈ Rn̄×n̄, B̄ ∈ Rn̄×m̄, C̄ ∈ R?̄?×n̄, D̄ ∈ R?̄?×q̄ (?̄? ≥ q̄), and W̄ ∈ Rn̄×𝑗
are known constant matrices with C̄ and D̄ being of full rank. The following assumptions are made.
Assumption 1. For every complex number s with nonnegative real part,
rank
[
sIn̄ − Ā
C̄
]
= n̄. (26)
Assumption 2. The nonlinear term 𝑓 (x̄(t), t) is assumed to be known and Lipschitz about x̄ uniformly, ie, ∀x̄, ̂̄x ∈ Rn̄,‖‖‖𝑓 (x̄(t), t) − 𝑓 ( ̂̄x(t), t)‖‖‖ ≤ 𝑓 ‖‖‖x̄(t) − ̂̄x(t)‖‖‖ , (27)
where 𝑓 is the Lipschitz constant and assumed to be unknown.
Assumption 3. The fault vector fa and its derivative
.
𝑓a satisfy the following norm bounded constraints:‖𝑓a‖ ≤ 𝜌a, ‖‖‖ .𝑓a‖‖‖ ≤ 𝜌aa, (28)
where 𝜌a and 𝜌aa are known positive constants.
Lemma 1. The pair (Ā, C̄) is observable if Assumption 1 holds.
This lemma is directly derived from the Popov-Belevitch-Hautus observability criterion. It follows from Lemma 1 that
there exists a matrix L ∈ Rn̄×?̄? such that Ā − LC̄ is stable, and thus, for any Q > 0, the Lyapunov equation(
Ā − LC̄
)TP + P (Ā − LC̄) = −Q (29)
has a unique solution P = PT > 0, where P ∈ Rn̄×n̄ is a symmetric positive definite matrix and Q ∈ Rn̄×n̄.
Remark 1. It follows fromAssumption 1 that the pair (Ā, C̄) is observable, which provides the necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of an observer for system (25). Assumption 2 states that the considered nonlinear system is
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Lipschitz. Many practical systems satisfy the Lipschitz condition, at least locally. In Assumption 2, the generic input
fault fa is assumed to be nonzero and differentiable after its occurrence. This assumption is quite general either for
constant faults and time-varying faults at limited rates.
Assumption 4. There exists an arbitrary matrix F ∈ Rh̄×?̄? such that
D̄TP = FC̄. (30)
For system (25), an AO is proposed in the following form:{
̇̄̂x(t) = Ā ̂̄x(t) + W̄𝑓
(
̂̄x, t
)
+ B̄u(t) + L
(
?̄? − ̂̄𝑦
)
+ 12 k̂W̄H
(
?̄? − ̂̄𝑦
)
+ D̄𝑓a
̂̄𝑦 = C̄ ̂̄x,
(31)
where the observer gain L ∈ Rn̄×?̄?, H ∈ R𝑗×?̄? is a matrix to be determined, and k̂ satisfies the following adaptation law:
̇̂k = lk‖‖‖H (?̄? − ̂̄𝑦)‖‖‖2, (32)
where lk is a positive constant.
The term 𝑓a represents the estimated fault and its dynamics is defined as
̇̂
𝑓 a = ΓF
(
?̄? − ̂̄𝑦
)
− 𝜀Γ𝑓a, (33)
where Γ ∈ Rh̄×h̄ is a symmetric positive definite matrix representing the learning rate, F ∈ Rh̄×?̄? is a matrix to be
determined, and 𝜖 is a positive scalar.
Denote ex = x̄ − ̂̄x, e𝑦 = ?̄? − ̂̄𝑦, and e𝑓 = 𝑓a − 𝑓a. Then, after the occurrence of the fault, the dynamics of the state
estimation error is obtained from
ėx =
(
Ā − LC̄
)
ex + W̄
(
𝑓 (x, t) − 𝑓
(
̂̄x, t
))
+ D̄e𝑓 . (34)
The following regions can be defined:
Ω1 =
{(
e𝑦, 𝑓a
)||| 𝜆min(P)‖‖C̄‖‖2 ‖‖e𝑦‖‖2 +
𝜆min
(
Γ−1
)
2
‖‖‖𝑓a‖‖‖2 ≤ 𝜆min (Γ−1) 𝜌2a + 𝜇3𝜇6
}
Ω2 =
{(
e𝑦, 𝑓a
)||| 𝜆min(P)‖‖C̄‖‖2 ‖‖e𝑦‖‖2 +
𝜆min
(
Γ−1
)
2
‖‖‖𝑓a‖‖‖2 > 𝜆min (Γ−1) 𝜌2a + 𝜇3𝜇6
}
𝜇1 = 𝜆min
(
−
(
Ā − LC̄
)TP − P (Ā − LC̄) − 2In̄) > 0
𝜇2 = 𝜆min(𝜀I − G) > 0
𝜇3 = 𝜌2aa𝜆max
(
Γ−1G−1Γ−1
)
+ 𝜀𝜌2a
𝜇4 = min(𝜇1, 𝜇2)
𝜇5 = max
(
𝜆max(P), 𝜆max
(
Γ−1
))
𝜇6 = 𝜇4∕𝜇5,
(35)
where G ∈ Rq̄×q̄, P = PT ∈ Rn̄×n̄ are symmetric positive definite matrices, and 𝜆min and 𝜆max are the smallest and largest
eigenvalues, respectively.
Theorem 1. Given system (25) with Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, if there exist matrices L, F, H, and P = PT > 0 such that
D̄TP = FC̄ (36)
W̄TP = HC̄ (37)
−Q + 2In̄ < 0, (38)
where −Q = (Ā − LC̄)TP + P(Ā − LC̄) ∈ Rn̄×n̄, then for a given matrix Γ and a positive scalar 𝜖, the error dynamics (34)
is uniformly bounded and (e𝑦, 𝑓a) converges toΩ1 at a rate greater than e−𝜇6t.17
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Proof. Consider the Lyapunov function as
V = eTx Pex + l−1k e
2
k∕2 + e
T
𝑓
Γ−1e𝑓 , (39)
where ek = k − k̂ and k is a constant, which is defined as k = 2𝑓 . The time derivative of V can be shown to be
.
V ≤ −eTx Qex + ‖ex‖2 + (2𝑓 − k̂)‖HCex‖2 − ek‖‖HC̄ex‖‖2 + 2eT𝑓Γ−1 .𝑓a + 2𝜀eT𝑓𝑓a − 2𝜀eT𝑓 e𝑓
≤ eTx (−Q + 2I)ex + 2eT𝑓Γ
−1 .𝑓a + 2𝜀eT𝑓𝑓a − 2𝜀e
T
𝑓
e𝑓 . (40)
Since 2XTY ≤ 1
𝛼
XTGX + 𝛼YTG−1Y holds for any scalar 𝛼 > 0 and symmetric positive definite matrix G, therefore
2eT
𝑓
Γ−1
.
𝑓a ≤ eT𝑓Ge𝑓 +
.
𝑓
T
a Γ−1G−1Γ−1
.
𝑓a ≤ eT𝑓Ge𝑓 + 𝜌aa𝜆max
(
Γ−1G−1Γ−1
)
. (41)
Moreover,
2𝜀eT
𝑓
𝑓a ≤ 𝜀‖‖e𝑓‖‖2 + 𝜀𝜌2a. (42)
Substituting (41) and (42) in (40) gives
.
V ≤ −eTx (Q − 2I)ex + eT𝑓 (G − 𝜀I)e𝑓 + 𝜌aa𝜆max(Γ
−1G−1Γ−1) + 𝜀𝜌2a
≤ −𝜇1‖ex‖2 − 𝜇2‖‖e𝑓‖‖2 + 𝜇3
≤ −𝜇4
(‖ex‖2 + ‖‖e𝑓‖‖2) + 𝜇3.
(43)
Moreover, from (39),
V ≤ 𝜆max(P)‖ex‖2 + 𝜆max (Γ−1) ‖‖e𝑓‖‖2
≤ max
(
𝜆max(P), 𝜆max
(
Γ−1
)) (‖ex‖2 + ‖‖e𝑓‖‖2)
= 𝜇5
(‖ex‖2 + ‖‖e𝑓‖‖2) .
(44)
Then,
.
V ≤ −𝜇6V + 𝜇3. (45)
For any real constant ?̄? and q̄ ∈ R, it results that
(?̄? − q̄)2 ≥ ?̄?
2
2 − q̄
2. (46)
Therefore,
V ≥ 𝜆min(P)‖ex‖2 + 𝜆min(Γ−1)‖e𝑓‖2 ≥ 𝜆min(P)‖C‖2 ‖‖e𝑦‖‖2 + 𝜆min(Γ−1)
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
‖‖‖𝑓a‖‖‖2
2 − 𝜌
2
a
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ . (47)
If (e𝑦, 𝑓a) ∈ Ω2, then V > 𝜇3∕𝜇6, and consequently,
.
V < 0. Therefore, it can be concluded that (e𝑦, 𝑓a) is uniformly
bounded and converges to Ω1 exponentially at a rate greater than e−𝜇6t.
Remark 2. The problem of finding matrices P = PT, L, H, and F to simultaneously satisfy the inequality (38), and
equalities (36) and (37) can be transformed into the following linear matrix inequality optimization problem:
minimize 𝛾1 + 𝛾2 subject to P > 0 and
PĀ + ĀTP − YC̄ − C̄TYT + 2In̄ < 0[
𝛾1Iq̄ D̄TP − FC̄(
D̄TP − FC̄
)T
𝛾1In̄
]
> 0,
[
𝛾2I𝑗 W̄TP −HC̄(
W̄TP −HC̄
)T
𝛾2In̄
]
> 0, (48)
where Y = PL.
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5.3 Adaptation of the generic adaptive estimator filter in case of output sensor faults
In a similar way, an AO can be designed for state observation and estimation of generic sensor faults on the basis of the
work presented in the work of Zhang et al.17 Consider a generic nonlinear system described by{ .x(t) = Ax(t) +W𝑓 (x, t) + Bu(t)
𝑦(t) = Cx(t) + D𝑓s(t),
(49)
where x ∈ Rn, u ∈ Rm, and 𝑦 ∈ R𝑝 denote, respectively, the vector of state variables, inputs, and outputs and 𝑓s ∈ Rq̄
is a not measurable vector, which is considered as an additive term resulting from output sensor faults. The nonlinear
continuous term 𝑓 (x, t) ∈ R𝑗 is assumed to be known. A ∈ Rn×n, B ∈ Rn×m, C ∈ R𝑝×n, D ∈ R𝑝×q (p ≥ q), andW ∈ Rn×𝑗
are known constant matrices with D being of full column rank. The following assumptions are made.
Assumption 5. The nonlinear term f(x, t) is assumed to be known and Lipschitz about x uniformly, ie, ∀x, x̂ ∈ Rn,‖𝑓 (x(t), t) − 𝑓 (x̂(t), t)‖ ≤ 𝑓 ‖x(t) − x̂(t)‖ , (50)
where 𝑓 is the Lipschitz constant and assumed to be unknown.
Assumption 6. The output sensor fault vector fs and its derivative
.
𝑓s satisfy the following norm bounded constraints:‖𝑓s‖ ≤ 𝜌s, ‖‖‖ .𝑓s‖‖‖ ≤ 𝜌ss, (51)
where 𝜌s and 𝜌ss are known positive constants.
As described in the work of Zhang et al,17 for system (49), a new state variable z = ∫ t0 𝑦(𝜏)d𝜏 can be defined so that.z(t) = Cx(t) + D𝑓o(t). An augmented system with the new state z and output w is therefore given as⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
.x(t) = Ax(t) +W𝑓 (x, t) + Bu(t)
.z(t) = Cx(t) + D𝑓o(t)
w(t) = z(t)
(52)
or in matricial form as [ .x.z ] = [A 0C 0 ] [ xz ] + [W𝑓 (x, t)0 ] + [ B0 ]u + [ 0D ] 𝑓s. (53)
This system can further be rewritten in a more compact form as{
̇̄x(t) = Āx̄(t) + W̄𝑓 (x̄, t) + B̄u(t) + D̄𝑓o(t)
?̄?(t) = w(t) = C̄x̄(t),
(54)
where x̄ ∈ Rn+𝑝, ?̄? = w ∈ R𝑝, Ā =
[
A 0
C 0
]
∈ R(n+𝑝)×(n+𝑝), B̄ =
[
B
0
]
∈ R(n+𝑝)×m, D̄ =
[
0
D
]
∈ R(n+𝑝)×q,
C̄ =
[
0 I𝑝
]
∈ R𝑝×(n+𝑝), and W̄ =
[
W
0
]
∈ R(n+𝑝)×m. It can be noted that the original sensor fault affecting the systemoutput
is nowmodelled as an input fault in the augmented system (54). Therefore, the same filter design procedure described in
Section 5.2 for generic input faults fu can be adapted and exploited to design an adaptive filter for the estimation of a
generic output sensor fault fo, where n̄ = n + 𝑝, ?̄? = 𝑝, m̄ = m, q̄ = q, and 𝑗 = 𝑗.
5.4 Design of adaptive filters for the estimation of reaction wheel actuator faults
and flywheel spin rate sensor faults
The NLGA FDD system is designed on the basis of a input affine nonlinear model structure (21) as described in the work
of De Persis and Isidori.7 With the assumption of a single actuator or sensor fault occurring at any time, it is possible
to design distinct AOs, which are specifically designed to accurately estimate a particular actuator or sensor fault. The
provided fault estimates can be directly exploited as diagnostic signals for the FDI task.
Considering the occurrence of possible actuator faults 𝑓Mi (i = 1, … , 4), and, since the measurements of the flywheel
spin rate sensors are assumed to be available, theNLGAcan be exploited to design 4 scalar AOs, as described in Section 5.2,
starting from actuatormodel (8). These AOs provide accurate estimates of the actuator faults and result to be independent
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of the aerodynamic disturbance and satellite attitude and angular velocity sensor faults. The scalar state variables x̄ of
these four NLGA AOs are defined as follows:
x̄1 = Irw𝜔rw,1 x̄3 = Irw𝜔rw,3
x̄2 = Irw𝜔rw,2 x̄4 = Irw𝜔rw,4.
(55)
Therefore, considering the generic nonlinearmodel (25) and the relatedAOmodel (31), the following terms can be defined
for each observer:
Ā = − bIrw
, B̄ = 1, C̄ = 1, D̄ = 1, W̄ = 1
𝑓 (x̄i, t) = −csgnx̄i, ui = Mi, 𝑓a,i = 𝑓Mi (i = 1, … , 4),
(56)
where b is the viscous friction coefficient, c is the Coulomb friction coefficient, and Irw is the flywheel inertia.
The model of each of these 4 AOs for i = 1, … , 4 is given by{
̇̄̂xi(t) = Ā ̂̄xi(t) + W̄𝑓
(
̂̄xi, t
)
+ B̄ui(t) + L
(
?̄?i − ̂̄𝑦i
)
+ 12 k̂W̄H
(
?̄?i − ̂̄𝑦i
)
+ D̄𝑓a,i
̂̄𝑦i(t) = C̄ ̂̄x.
(57)
The term 𝑓a,i represents the estimated actuator fault affecting the ith reaction wheel motor.
Remark 3. The provided fault estimates 𝑓a,i (i = 1, … , 4) are directly exploited as diagnostic signals 𝜉i (i = 1, … , 4)
also for the FDI task.
On the other hand, considering the occurrence of possible flywheel spin rate sensor faults 𝑓𝜔rw,𝑗 (j = 1, … , 4), starting
from the augmented nonlinear spacecraft model (17), the NLGA can be exploited to design 4 vectorial AOs, as described
in Section 5.3. These AOs provide accurate estimates of the flywheel spin rate sensor faults and result to be independent
of the aerodynamic disturbance and satellite attitude and angular velocity sensor faults. The augmented state vectors x̄ of
these 4 NLGA AOs are defined as follows:
x̄1 =
[
𝜔rw,1, z𝜔rw,1
]T x̄3 = [𝜔rw,3, z𝜔rw,3]T
x̄2 =
[
𝜔rw,2, z𝜔rw,2
]T x̄4 = [𝜔rw,4, z𝜔rw,4]T , (58)
where 𝜔rw,j (j = 1, … , 4) are the spin rates of the 4 flywheels and z𝜔rw,𝑗 (j = 1, … , 4) are the corresponding new state
variables introduced through the model augmentation described in Section 4 by means of the integration of the output
variables.
Therefore, considering the generic nonlinear model (49) and the related AO model (31), the following terms can be
defined for each observer:
Ā =
[
− bIrw 0
1 0
]
, B̄ =
[ 1
Irw
0
]
, C̄ =
[
0 1
]
, D̄ =
[
0
1
]
, W̄ =
[
1
0
]
𝑓
(
x̄𝑗 , t
)
= −
csgn𝜔rw,i
Irw
, u𝑗 = M𝑗 , 𝑓s𝑗 = 𝑓𝜔rw𝑗 (𝑗 = 1, … , 4). (59)
The model of each of these 4 AOs for j = 1, … , 4 is given by{
̇̄̂z𝑗(t) = Ā ̂̄z𝑗(t) + W̄𝑓
(
̂̄z𝑗 , t
)
+ B̄u𝑗(t) + L̄
(
?̄?𝑗 − ̂̄𝑦𝑗
)
+ 12 k̂W̄H̄(w𝑗 − ŵ𝑗) + D̄𝑓s,𝑗
̂̄𝑦 = ŵ𝑗 = C̄ ̂̄x𝑗 .
(60)
In this case, the term 𝑓s,𝑗 represents the estimated fault affecting the jth flywheel spin rate sensor.
Remark 4. The provided fault estimates 𝑓s,𝑗 (j = 1, … , 4) are directly exploited as diagnostic signals 𝜉i (i = 5, … , 8)
for the FDI task.
Remark 5. It is worth noting that, actually, each of the 8 NLGA AOs described results to be sensitive to the couple of
faults 𝑓Mi and 𝑓𝜔rw,𝑗 (i = j), ie, the actuator and flywheel spin rate sensor faults related to the same ith reaction wheel,
respectively.
In fact, the flywheel spin rate sensor fault 𝑓𝜔rw,𝑗 directly affects the residual signal ?̄?i − ̂̄𝑦i driving the actuator fault
estimate of the adaptive filters relying on the variables (55). On the other hand, the actuator fault 𝑓Mi still indirectly affects,
through the integration of the measured sensor outputs, the residual signal ?̄?𝑗 − ̂̄𝑦𝑗 driving the sensor fault estimate of the
adaptive filters relying on the variables (58).
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However, since each of these 8 adaptive estimation filters is designed to provide accurate estimates with respect to the
occurrence of a specific actuator or flywheel spin rate sensor fault, the provided signals 𝑓a,i (i = 1, … , 4) result to be
correct fault estimates only in case of actuator faults 𝑓Mi , whilst they do not represent estimates of the actual faults in
case of flywheel spin rate sensor faults 𝑓𝜔rw,𝑗 . Analogously, the provided signals 𝑓s,𝑗 (j = 1, … , 4) result to be correct fault
estimates only in case of sensor faults 𝑓𝜔rw,𝑗 , whilst they do not represent estimates of the actual faults in case of actuator
faults 𝑓Mi .
Therefore, in general, these estimates allow for the isolation of the reaction wheel subsystem affected by a possible
actuator or sensor fault, but it could not be possible to achieve an exact and complete fault isolation by exploiting only
these signals. This can be achieved, thanks to the NLGA, by designing and exploiting an additional residual filter to
precisely classify a detected fault as an actuator or sensor fault with the assumption of a single actuator or sensor fault
occurring at any time. The use of the NLGA results to be fundamental to design an additional residual filter that results
to be decoupled from the aerodynamic disturbance to obtain a diagnostic signal not subject to detection errors due to
parametric uncertainties of the aerodynamic disturbance model. This NLGA residual filter exploits also satellite attitude
and angular speed measurements in addition to the flywheel spin rate measurements. The dynamic equation determined
through the NLGA results to be insensitive to any possible actuator fault and sensitive to a mathematical combination of
all the spacecraft sensor faults and thus also to the flywheel spin rate sensor faults.
Starting from (24), a generic residual generator in filter form is modelled as follows:
{ .
𝜉 = n1(?̄?1, ?̄?2) + g1(?̄?1, ?̄?2)uc + L(?̄?1 − 𝜉)
𝜀 = ?̄?1 − 𝜉,
(61)
where L > 0 is the gain of the asymptotically stable residual filter and 𝜖 is the generated diagnostic signal. The state vector
x̄ of this additional residual generator, obtained by means of the NLGA on the basis of (13), is defined as follows:
x̄ =
[
rxc𝑝 (Ixx𝜔1 + T1Irw𝜔rw) + r𝑦c𝑝
(
I𝑦𝑦𝜔2 + T2Irw𝜔rw
)
+ rzc𝑝 (Izz𝜔3 + T3Irw𝜔rw)
]
, (62)
where T1, T2, and T3 are the rows of the matrix Trw, z𝜔l (l = 1, … , 3).
Remark 6. The provided residual signal 𝜖 is exploited as additional diagnostic signal 𝜉9 to precisely classify a detected
fault as an actuator or flywheel spin rate sensor fault for the complete isolation. After the correct isolation of the
occurred actuator or sensor fault, the corresponding accurate estimate is selected among the diagnostic signals
𝜉1, … , 𝜉8.
5.5 Design of adaptive filters for the estimation of satellite attitude and angular velocity
sensor faults
Considering the occurrence of possible faults fq,k (k = 1, 2) affecting the 2 considered attitude sensors, starting from the
augmented nonlinear spacecraft model (17), the NLGA can be exploited to design 2 AOs, as described in Section 5.3.
These AOs provide accurate estimates of the attitude sensor fault vectors and result to be independent of the aerodynamic
disturbance and actuator and sensor faults affecting the reaction wheel subsystems. Since the measurements of 2 attitude
sensors are assumed to be available, each observer exploits the measurements of a different attitude sensor, in addition to
the shared angular velocity measurements.
The augmented state vectors x̄ of these 2 NLGA AOs are defined as follows:
x̄1 =
[
qT , zTq𝟏
]T
, x̄2 =
[
qT , zTq𝟐
]T
, (63)
where q is the quaternion state vector and zqk (k = 1, 2) are the corresponding new state vectors introduced through the
model augmentation described in Section 4 by means of the integration of the available output vectors provided by the 2
considered attitude sensors. Each of these 2 observer exploits the quaternion measurements qy,k (k = 1, 2) of a specific
kth attitude sensor and provides the accurate estimate of the corresponding fault vector fq,k = [𝑓q1 , 𝑓q2 , 𝑓q3 , 𝑓q4]T (with
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k = 1, 2). Therefore, considering the generic nonlinear model (49) and the related AO model (31), the following terms
can be defined for each observer:
Ā =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 0 𝜔02 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 𝜔02 0 0 0 0
−𝜔02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −𝜔02 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, C̄ =
[
0 I4
]
, D̄ =
[
0
I4
]
, W̄ = 12
[
I4
0
]
𝑓 (z̄k, 𝑦, t) =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
𝜔3q2 − 𝜔2q3 + 𝜔1q4 + 𝜔0q3
−𝜔3q1 + 𝜔1q3 + 𝜔2q4 + 𝜔0q4
𝜔2q1 − 𝜔1q2 + 𝜔3q4 − 𝜔0q1
−𝜔1q1 − 𝜔2q2 − 𝜔3q3 − 𝜔0q2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ , 𝑓sk = fq,k (k = 1, 2), (64)
where 𝜔0 is the orbital angular velocity, q = [q1, q2, q3, q4]T , and the measurements of the satellite angular velocity terms
𝜔l (l = 1, … , 3) are considered as independent measured inputs as illustrated in Section 5.1. The model of each of these
2 AOs for k = 1, 2 is given by{
̇̄̂xk(t) = Ā ̂̄xk(t) + W̄𝑓
(
̂̄xk, 𝑦, t
)
+ L̄
(
?̄?k − ̂̄𝑦k
)
+ 12 k̂W̄H̄
(
?̄?k − ̂̄𝑦k
)
+ D̄𝑓s,k
̂̄𝑦k = ŵk = C̄ ̂̄xk.
(65)
In this case, the term 𝑓s,k represents the estimated fault vector affecting the kth attitude sensor.
Remark 7. The estimated fault vectors 𝑓s,1 and 𝑓s,2 are directly exploited as 2 sets of diagnostic signals 𝜉i (i =
10, … , 13) and 𝜉i (i = 14, … , 17), respectively, for the FDI task.
These estimates allow the isolation of the attitude sensor affected by a possible fault since only theNLGAAO specifically
exploiting the faulty attitude sensor measurements provide a fault estimate 𝑓s,k (k = 1, 2) different from zero with the
assumption of a single fault occurring at any time.
However, it is worth noting that, actually, both of these NLGA AOs result to be sensitive also to any angular velocity
sensor fault 𝑓𝜔l (l = 1, … , 3). In fact, the angular velocity sensor faults 𝑓𝜔l directly affects, through the use of the cor-
responding measured sensor outputs as independent inputs, the observer dynamic model, and then the residual signal
?̄?k − ̂̄𝑦k driving the adaptive fault estimate. Since the same angular velocity measurements are exploited as independent
inputs by both of the AOs, in case of any angular velocity sensor fault 𝑓𝜔l (l = 1, … , 3), both of the provided fault estimates
𝑓s,k (k = 1, 2) result to be different from zero and with the same behaviour.
Moreover, since the AOs are specifically designed with respect to the occurrence of attitude sensor faults, the provided
signals 𝑓s,k (k = 1, 2) result to be accurate fault estimates only in case of attitude sensor faults fq,k, whilst they do not
represent accurate estimates of the actual faults in case of any angular velocity sensor fault 𝑓𝜔l(l = 1, … , 3). On the other
hand, considering the occurrence of possible satellite angular velocity sensor faults 𝑓𝜔l (l = 1, … , 3), starting from the
nonlinear spacecraft model (13), the NLGA can be exploited to design an AO as described in Section 5.2. In particular, this
AOprovides accurate estimates of the angular velocity faults and results to be independent of the aerodynamic disturbance
and actuator and sensor faults affecting the reaction wheel subsystems. The state vector x̄ of this NLGA AO is defined as
follows:
x̄ =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(
q21 − q22 − q
2
3 + q
2
4
)(
−q21 + q22 − q
2
3 + q
2
4
)(
−q21 − q22 + q
2
3 + q
2
4
)
2(q1q2 + q3q4)
2(q1q3 + q2q4)
2(q1q4 + q2q3)
2(q1q2 − q3q4)
2(q1q3 − q2q4)
2(q2q3 − q1q4)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (66)
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Therefore, considering the generic nonlinearmodel (25) and the relatedAOmodel (31), the following terms can be defined
for this observer:
Ā =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 𝜔0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −𝜔0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 𝜔0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 −𝜔0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 𝜔0 0 0 0
−𝜔0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, C̄ = I9, D̄ = I9, W̄ = I9
𝑓 (x̄, 𝑦, t) =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−2𝜔2(q1q3 + q2q4) + 2𝜔3(q1q2 − q3q4)
2𝜔1(q2q3 − q1q4) − 2𝜔3(q1q2 + q3q4)
−2𝜔1(q1q4 + q2q3) + 2𝜔2(q1q3 − q2q4)
−2𝜔2(q2q3 − q1q4) + 𝜔3
(
−q21 + q22 − q
2
3 + q
2
4
)
−2𝜔1(q1q2 − q3q4) + 𝜔2
(
q21 − q22 − q
2
3 + q
2
4
)
𝜔1
(
−q21 − q22 + q
2
3 + q
2
4
)
− 2𝜔3(q1q3 − q2q4)
2𝜔1(q1q3 + q2q4) − 𝜔3
(
q21 − q22 − q
2
3 + q
2
4
)
2𝜔3(q1q4 + q2q3) − 𝜔2
(
−q21 − q22 + q
2
3 + q
2
4
)
2𝜔2(q1q2 + q3q4) − 𝜔1
(
−q21 + q22 − q
2
3 + q
2
4
)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
𝑓a =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−2𝑓𝜔2(q1q3 + q2q4) + 2𝑓𝜔3(q1q2 − q3q4)
2𝑓𝜔1(q2q3 − q1q4) − 2𝑓𝜔3 (q1q2 + q3q4)
−2𝑓𝜔1(q1q4 + q2q3) + 2𝑓𝜔2(q1q3 − q2q4)
−2𝑓𝜔2 (q2q3 − q1q4) + 𝑓𝜔3
(
−q21 + q22 − q
2
3 + q
2
4
)
−2𝑓𝜔1(q1q2 − q3q4) + 𝑓𝜔2
(
q21 − q22 − q
2
3 + q
2
4
)
𝑓𝜔1
(
−q21 − q22 + q
2
3 + q
2
4
)
− 2𝑓𝜔3 (q1q3 − q2q4)
2𝑓𝜔1 (q1q3 + q2q4) − 𝑓𝜔3
(
q21 − q22 − q
2
3 + q
2
4
)
2𝑓𝜔3(q1q4 + q2q3) − 𝑓𝜔2
(
−q21 − q22 + q
2
3 + q
2
4
)
2𝑓𝜔2(q1q2 + q3q4) − 𝑓𝜔1
(
−q21 + q22 − q
2
3 + q
2
4
)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
(67)
where the elements of the additive fault vector fa that is actually estimated by the AO are functions of the observer state
vector x̄ and actual satellite angular velocity sensor faults 𝑓𝜔l (l = 1, … , 3). In the same way, considering the satellite
angular velocity terms 𝜔l (l = 1, … , 3) as independent measured inputs as illustrated in Section 5.1, the nonlinear terms
of the AO are functions of the observer state vector x̄ and satellite angular velocities 𝜔l(l = 1, … , 3). Therefore, the model
of this AO is given by {
̇̄̂x(t) = Ā ̂̄x(t) + W̄𝑓 ( ̂̄x, 𝑦, t) + L
(
?̄? − ̂̄𝑦
)
+ D̄𝑓a
̂̄𝑦 = C̄ ̂̄x,
(68)
where the term 𝑓a represents the estimated additive fault vector defined in (67).
Remark 8. The estimated fault vector 𝑓a is directly exploited as a set of diagnostic signals 𝜉i (i = 18, … , 26) also for
the FDI task.
The use of the NLGA allows to design an AO whose each state vector element is characterised by dynamics actually
sensitive only to a specific couple of physical angular velocity sensor faults 𝑓𝜔l (l = 1, … , 3) through the mathematical
relations of fa,1 in (67). Therefore, the provided diagnostic signals 𝜉i (i = 18, … , 26) can be organised as a generalised
scheme.
In particular, the 3 diagnostic signals 𝜉18, 𝜉21, and 𝜉25 are sensitive only to the 2 angular velocity sensor faults 𝑓𝜔2 and
𝑓𝜔3 and not sensitive to the fault 𝑓𝜔1 . The 3 diagnostic signals 𝜉19, 𝜉23, and 𝜉24 are sensitive only to the 2 angular velocity
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sensor faults 𝑓𝜔1 and 𝑓𝜔3 and not sensitive to the fault 𝑓𝜔2 . Finally, the 3 diagnostic signals 𝜉20, 𝜉22, and 𝜉26 are sensitive
only to the 2 angular velocity sensor faults 𝑓𝜔1 and 𝑓𝜔2 and not sensitive to the fault 𝑓𝜔3 . These diagnostic signals allow
for the accurate isolation of the angular velocity sensor actually affected by a possible fault through a proper cross-check
and decision logic.
Once a faulty angular velocity sensor has been correctly detected and isolated, the estimate 𝑓𝜔l (l = 1, … , 3) of the
actual fault 𝑓𝜔l (l = 1, … , 3) affecting the sensor can be derived by means of the mathematical relations of fa in (67)
and by exploiting the available attitude measurements thanks to the assumption of a single angular velocity sensor fault
occurring at any time.
6 DIAGNOSTIC SIGNAL CROSS-CHECK SCHEME
The FDI task is achieved by means of a proper cross-check procedure of the diagnostic signals and exploiting a suitable
decision logic to correctly detect and isolate the occurred fault, with the assumption of single fault at any time.
It is important to observe that, in this paper, the fault estimates 𝜉1, … , 𝜉26 obtained by the designed NLGA adaptive
filters are directly exploited as diagnostic signals also for the FDI task. These diagnostic signals are simultaneously checked
to detect and isolate any of the considered actuator and sensor faults, without making any a priori assumption regarding
the occurring type of fault.Moreover, due to the presence ofmeasurement noise, thresholds have to be properly selected for
the generated diagnostic signals 𝜉1, … , 𝜉26 to achieve the best performances in terms of false alarm andmissed detection
rates. The values reported in Table 1 have been empirically selected for each diagnostic signal by means of a 6− 𝜎 rule in
a fault-free condition without parametric uncertainty.
6.1 Fault detection and isolation Scheme for actuator and flywheel spin rate sensor faults
Assuming a single fault at any time, possible faults affecting the actuated reaction wheel motor torques or flywheel spin
rate measurements can be detected and isolated by cross-checking the 9 signals 𝜉1, … , 𝜉9 provided by the NLGA AOs
relying on the variables (55), (58), and (62) described in Section 5.4 as follows.
1. First, the 2 sets of diagnostic signals 𝜉1, … , 𝜉4 and 𝜉5, … , 𝜉8 are analyzed. The first 4 signals represent accurate esti-
mates only of possible faults affecting the actuated control torques, whilst the other 4 represent accurate estimates only
of possible flywheel spin rate sensor faults. Since each of the corresponding observers is sensitive only to the couple
of possible actuator and sensor faults affecting a specific reaction wheel, the faulty reaction wheel subsystem can be
easily detected and isolated as a fault estimate exceeds a properly selected threshold.
2. Subsequently, a check on the additional diagnostic signal 𝜉9 allows to precisely isolate also the type of the occurred
fault (ie, its location in the reaction wheel subsystem) since this signal is sensitive only to a combination of sensor
faults and insensitive to any actuator fault. The diagnostic signal 𝑓𝜉9 does not exceed the selected threshold after the
occurrence of any actuator fault, whilst it does after the occurrence of any flywheel spin rate sensor fault.
TABLE 1 Selected residual threshold values
Diagnostic signal Threshold Diagnostic signal Threshold Diagnostic signal Threshold
𝜉1 2.58 · 10−2 𝜉10 3.67 · 10−5 𝜉18 5.54 · 10−5
𝜉2 3.06 · 10−2 𝜉11 3.65 · 10−5 𝜉19 2.85 · 10−5
𝜉3 3.00 · 10−2 𝜉12 4.08 · 10−5 𝜉20 5.11 · 10−5
𝜉4 2.52 · 10−2 𝜉13 1.45 · 10−5 𝜉21 8.28 · 10−5
𝜉5 0.5298 𝜉14 3.67 · 10−5 𝜉22 6.95 · 10−5
𝜉6 0.5496 𝜉15 3.65 · 10−5 𝜉23 8.72 · 10−5
𝜉7 0.4074 𝜉16 4.08 · 10−5 𝜉24 7.71 · 10−5
𝜉8 0.7128 𝜉17 1.45 · 10−5 𝜉25 6.61 · 10−5
𝜉9 1.52 · 10−2 𝜉26 8.11 · 10−5
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6.2 Fault detection and isolation scheme for satellite attitude and angular velocity
sensor faults
The occurrence of a possible fault affecting the measurements of the satellite attitude and angular velocity sensors can be
detected and isolated by cross-checking the 2 sets of 4 diagnostic signals 𝜉10, … , 𝜉13 and 𝜉14, … , 𝜉17 and the 9 diagnostic
signals 𝜉18, … , 𝜉26 provided by the NLGAAO relying on the variables (63) and (66) described in Section 5.5, respectively,
as follows.
1. First, the 2 sets 𝜉10, … , 𝜉13 and 𝜉14, … , 𝜉17 are compared. Since each set exploits the measurements of a different
attitude sensor and of the same angular velocity sensors, the 2 sets show different signal behaviours in case of attitude
sensor faults and the same behaviours in case of angular velocity sensor faults. Hence, it can be recognized if an attitude
or angular velocity sensor fault has occurred.
2. A faulty attitude sensor is isolated by checking which is the only set with signals exceeding the selected thresholds.
3. On the other hand, a faulty angular velocity sensor is isolated by checking the 3 signals of the set 𝜉18, … , 𝜉26 not
sensitive to each specific angular velocity sensor fault and thus not exceeding the selected thresholds.
7 SIMULATION RESULTS
Some results achieved in MATLAB/Simulink® are reported in the following sections to show the effectiveness of the
proposed diagnosis scheme.
7.1 Simulation parameters and fault scenarios
The satellite body is modelled as a rectangular parallelepiped whose principal dimensions are d = 0.6m, w = 2m, and
h = 7.5m (depth x width x height), rcp = [0.10, 0.15,−0.35] m is the aerodynamic torque displacement vector, while
the inertia values are Ixx = 330kg · m2, I𝑦𝑦 = 280kg · m2, and Izz = 60kg · m2. A circular orbit at an altitude of 350 km
and null inclination, with a low Earth equatorial orbit radius R = 6728.140 km is considered. The atmosphere density
is 𝜌 = 𝜌max = 6 · 10−11 kg∕m3, the drag coefficient is CD = 2.2, the orbital velocity is V = 8187.63m/s, and the Earth's
gravitational constant 𝜇 = 39.86004418 · 1013 m3∕s2.
The reaction wheels maximal torque is set to 0.75Nm. The viscous and Coulomb friction coefficients are b = 5.16 ·
10−6 Nms and c = 0.8795 · 10−3 Nm, respectively. A flywheel moment of inertia Irw = 0.05kg ·m2 and initial flywheel spin
rate values 𝜔0 = [1500, 1500,−1500,−1500]T rpm for the 4 considered reaction wheels are assumed.
A standard sliding mode controller has been implemented in the ACS. A gradual attitude change manoeuvre is consid-
ered, commencing at tman = 10 s from the initial attitude q0 = [−0.0570, 0.3180, 0.1663, 0.9316]T to reach the final one
q = [−0.0429, 0.2732, 0.1815, 0.9437]T . These quaternion vectors correspond to [𝜑0, 𝜃0, 𝜓0, ]T = [−15, 35, 25]T deg and
[𝜑, 𝜃, 𝜓, ]T = [−12, 30, 25]T deg for the attitude in Euler angles (ie, roll, pitch, and yaw angles), respectively.
Assuming a single fault at any time, 4 additive fault scenarios commencing at tfault = 20 s are considered.
1. Actuator fault: 𝑓M2 = −aM𝜔rw2 − bM with aM linearly passing from zero at t = 20 s to 0.003Nms at t = 30 s and
bM = 0.05Nm;
2. Flywheel sensor fault: 𝑓𝜔rw,2 = −a𝜔rw with a𝜔rw linearly passing from zero at t = 20 s to −0.5235 rad/s = −100 rpm at
t = 45 s and then changing from −0.5235 rad/s = −100 rpm at t = 50 s to −0.2618 rad/s = −50 rpm at t = 55 s;
3. Attitude sensor fault: fq,1 additive on the first quaternion measurement, corresponding to a constant bias of 8.7266 ·
10−4 rad = 0.05 deg on the roll angle measurements;
4. Angular velocity sensor fault: 𝑓𝜔3 = −a𝜔 sin(b𝜔t)with a𝜔 linearly passing from zero at t = 20 s to 6.9808 · 10−4 rad/s at
t = 40 s and b𝜔 = 0.05𝜋 rad/s = 0.025Hz.
It is noted that the proposed diagnosis scheme does not assume any a priori hypothesis regarding the fault type and that
the diagnosis system takes into account the possible occurrence of faults affecting any actuator or sensor of the satellite
ADCS. Moreover, the generic additive faults can be used to represent different fault causes (eg, mechanical, electrical,
thermal, magnetic damages and malfunctions, parameter variations, etc), and behaviours (eg, lock-in-place, failure, loss
of effectiveness, drift, bias, etc). Sensor noises are modelled by Gaussian processes with zero mean. Standard deviations
equal to 3 arcsec, 3 arcsec/s, and 1 rpm are assumed for the attitude measured in Euler angles, satellite angular speed, and
flywheel spin rate measurements, respectively. A simulation time of 60 s with a sampling time of 0.025 s is considered.
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FIGURE 1 Actuator fault: 4 diagnostic signals sensitive to faults on a specific reaction wheel and additional residual signal sensitive only
to sensor faults. FDI, fault detection and isolation [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
7.2 Fault scenario 1: Diagnosis of actuator faults
In case of the actuator fault𝑓M2 , the FDI task can be carried out by cross-checking the 5 diagnostic signals 𝜉1, … , 𝜉4 and 𝜉9,
described in Section 5.4, on the basis of the decision logic, described in Section 6.1. Figure 1 shows the 4 diagnostic signals
𝜉1, … , 𝜉4, provided by the NLGA AOs based on the state variables (55), and the diagnostic signal 𝜉9, which is sensitive
only to sensor faults and decoupled from the aerodynamic disturbance and actuator faults. In particular, the signal 𝜉2 is
sensitive to the couple of faults 𝑓M2 and 𝑓𝜔rw,2 , although it actually represents the correct estimate of 𝑓M2 only. The selected
thresholds are depicted for each signal by means of red lines. It is possible to detect and isolate the faulty subsystem just
by means of the 4 diagnostic signals 𝜉1, … , 𝜉4. After the isolation of the faulty reaction wheel subsystem, a check on the
signal 𝜉9 allows to precisely isolate also the type of the occurred fault (ie, its location) since this residual is sensitive only
to sensor faults and insensitive to actuator faults. It does not exceed the selected threshold in case of actuator faults.
Once an actuator fault 𝑓Mi (i = 1, … , 4) has been detected and isolated, the corresponding estimate is directly given by
the related diagnostic signal 𝑓Mi = 𝜉i (i = 1, … , 4), which has been exploited also for the FDI task. Figure 2 shows the
estimate 𝑓M2 of the actuator fault 𝑓M2 provided by the corresponding NLGA AO. It can be seen that the AO provides an
accurate estimate of the occurred fault, even in case of a generic fault function.
7.3 Fault scenario 2 diagnosis of flywheel spin rate sensor faults
On the other hand, in case of the flywheel spin rate sensor fault 𝑓𝜔rw,2 , the FDI task can be carried out by cross-checking the
5 diagnostic signals 𝜉5, … , 𝜉9, described in Section 5.4, on the basis of the decision logic, described in Section 6.1. Figure 3
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
f M
2 
[N
m]
True and estimated actuator fault f
M
2
Time (sec)
 
 
Fault Estimate True Fault
FIGURE 2 Estimate of the actuator fault 𝑓M2 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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FIGURE 3 Flywheel sensor fault: 4 diagnostic signals sensitive to faults on a specific reaction wheel and additional residual signal
sensitive only to sensor faults. FDI, fault detection and isolation [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
shows the 4 diagnostic signals 𝜉5, … , 𝜉8 provided by the NLGA AOs based on the variables (58). In particular, the signal
𝜉6 is sensitive to the couple of faults 𝑓M2 and 𝑓𝜔rw,2 , although it actually represents the correct estimate of 𝑓𝜔rw,2 only. As
already described, the diagnostic signal 𝜉9 is sensitive only to flywheel sensor faults and decoupled from the aerodynamic
disturbance and actuator faults and allows to precisely isolate also the type (ie, its location) of the occurred fault since
this residual is sensitive only to sensor faults and insensitive to actuator faults. In this case, it does exceed the selected
threshold after the sensor fault occurrence. Hence, the occurred flywheel sensor fault can be correctly isolated thanks
to the different behaviour of this additional diagnostic signal. Once a flywheel spin rate sensor fault 𝑓𝜔rw, 𝑗 (j = 1, … , 4)
has been detected and isolated, the corresponding estimate is directly given by the related diagnostic signal 𝑓𝜔rw, 𝑗 = 𝜉i
(i = 6, … , 9), which has been exploited also for the FDI task. Figure 4 shows the estimate 𝑓𝜔rw,2 of the sensor fault 𝑓𝜔rw,2 .
Remark 9. Even if there are detection delays to exceed thresholds, the fault estimates do not suffer from delay since
these signals coincide with the diagnostic signals exploited also by the FDI system, which are available in real time,
and there are no estimation filters to be activated and initialized after the fault isolation.
7.4 Fault scenario 3: Diagnosis of satellite attitude sensor faults
The occurrence of faults affecting 1 of the 2 considered attitude sensors can be detected and isolated by exploiting the first
2 NLGA AOs described in Section 5.5.
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FIGURE 4 Estimate of the flywheel sensor fault 𝑓𝜔rw,2 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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FIGURE 5 Attitude sensor fault: 2 sets of diagnostic signals provided by the adaptive observer exploiting the measurements of the first (left)
and second (right) attitude sensor, respectively. FDI, fault detection and isolation [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
The diagnostic signals 𝜉10, … , 𝜉13 and 𝜉14, … , 𝜉17 obtained bymeans of the corresponding 2 AOs represent the correct
estimates of the components of possible attitude sensor faults fq,1 and fq,2 affecting the first and second attitude sensor,
respectively. Therefore, assuming a single fault occurring at any time, in case of attitude sensor fault, the 2 observers, each
providing the estimate of a possible additive fault fq,k (k = 1, 2) affecting a specific attitude sensor, are characterised by
diagnostic signals with different behaviours, as described in Section 6.2. Figure 5 shows on the left the diagnostic signals
𝜉10, … , 𝜉13 provided by the AO exploiting the measurements of the first attitude sensor and angular velocity sensors, the
diagnostic signals 𝜉14, … , 𝜉17 provided by the AO exploiting the measurements of the second attitude sensor, and same
angular velocity sensors. It can be seen that the 2 sets of diagnostic signals are characterised by different behaviours.
Hence, the occurrence of a fault affecting a specific attitude sensor, which is feeding the set whose diagnostic signals
exceed the selected thresholds, can be isolated as described in Section 6.2.
Figure 6 shows the estimate 𝑓q,1 obtained once the considered additive fault 𝑓q,1 affecting the first attitude sensor has
been properly isolated. The estimates of the additive fault components are directly given by the related diagnostic signals
𝑓q,1 = [𝜉10, 𝜉11, 𝜉12, 𝜉13]T , which have been exploited also for the FDI task.
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7.5 Fault scenario 4: Diagnosis of satellite angular velocity sensor faults
The occurrence of faults affecting any satellite angular velocity component can be detected and isolated by exploiting the
3 NLGA AOs described in Section 5.5.
The diagnostic signals 𝜉10, … , 𝜉13 and 𝜉14, … , 𝜉17 are actually sensitive also to the occurrence of faults affecting any
satellite angular velocity component since the 2 observers exploit also the angular velocity measurements as independent
inputs. Therefore, assuming a single fault occurring at any time, in case of angular velocity sensor fault 𝑓𝜔3 , the 2 observers
are characterised by diagnostic signals with the same behaviours and exceeding the selected thresholds, since they exploit
the same angular velocity measurements, as described in Section 6.2. However, it is not yet possible to isolate the specific
faulty angular velocity sensor on the basis of these diagnostic signals only. Therefore, once a fault affecting a generic
angular velocity sensor has been detected, the 9 diagnostic signals 𝜉18, … , 𝜉26 have to be exploited to accurately isolate
the specific faulty angular velocity sensor. In particular, Figure 7 shows the 3 diagnostic signals 𝜉18, 𝜉21, and 𝜉25 that
are sensitive only to the 2 angular velocity sensor faults 𝑓𝜔2 , 𝑓𝜔3 and not sensitive to the fault 𝑓𝜔1 . Figure 8 shows the 3
diagnostic signals 𝜉19, 𝜉23, 𝜉24 that are sensitive only to the 2 angular velocity sensor faults 𝑓𝜔1 and 𝑓𝜔3 and not sensitive
to the fault 𝑓𝜔2 . Finally, Figure 9 shows the 3 diagnostic signals 𝜉20, 𝜉22, and 𝜉26 that are sensitive only to the 2 angular
velocity sensor faults 𝑓𝜔1 and 𝑓𝜔2 and not sensitive to the fault 𝑓𝜔3 .
In this case, in Figure 9, the last 3 signals 𝜉20, 𝜉22, and 𝜉26, which result to be decoupled from possible faults affecting the
third angular velocity sensor, do not exceed the selected thresholds. On the contrary, the other 6 signals generally result
to be sensitive to the occurred angular velocity sensor fault. Finally, Figure 10 shows the estimate 𝑓𝜔3 obtained once the
fault 𝑓𝜔3 has been properly isolated. The estimate of the actual fault is mathematically derived directly from the diagnostic
signals 𝜉18, … , 𝜉26, which have been exploited to complete the fault isolation task.
7.6 Robustness analysis
In order to assess the robustness and reliability of the proposed FDI scheme, several Monte-Carlo simulations have been
performed in case of different parametric uncertainties. The following parameters have been assumed as uncertain in the
actual satellite model or in the filters model with the following distributions and characteristic values directly reported in
the following tables.
1. Drag coefficient CD in filter model: normal distribution with standard deviation 𝜎CD and mean (nominal)
value 𝜇Cd = 2.2;
2. Air density 𝜌 in satellite model: uniform distribution between 𝜌min = 2 · 10−12 kg∕m3 and 𝜌max = 6 · 10−11 kg∕m3;
3. Earth gravitational constant 𝜇 in satellite model: uniform distribution between 𝜇min ∕max = 39.86004418±0.00000008 ·
1013m3∕s2;
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4. Inertia vector Isat in filter model: normal distributions with standard deviation 𝜎Ist for each single component and
mean (nominal) values Isat = [330, 280, 60]kg ·m2;
5. Aerodynamic displacement vector rcp in filter model: normal distributions with standard deviation 𝜎r for each single
component and mean (nominal) value rcp = [0.10, 0.15, −0.35]m.
Remark 10. No uncertainties affecting the flywheel moments of inertia or reaction wheel friction parameters have
been considered in this analysis, since the flywheel moments can be easily and accurately verified bymeans of labora-
tory tests during the satellite design phase, whilst any possible variation or uncertainty of the friction parameters with
respect to the nominal values has been considered as actually due tomechanical actuator faults to be detected, isolated,
and estimated (eg, due to loss of lubrication, mechanical bearing damages, etc). Moreover, the accurate knowledge of
the flywheel moment of inertia in the reaction wheel model allows to obtain accurate estimates of the actuator and
flywheel spin rate sensor faults exploiting the proposed AOs.
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FIGURE 10 Estimate of the angular velocity sensor fault 𝑓𝜔3 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
For performance analysis of the proposed fault detection and isolation scheme, sensitivity or true positive rate (TPR),
specificity or true negative rate (SPC), and accuracy (ACC) performance metrics are calculated as follows26:
TPR = TP
(TP+FN) SPC =
TN
(TN+FP) ACC =
TP+TN
(TP+FP+TN+FN) , (69)
where true positive (TP) represents the number of trials during which the fault is correctly detected and isolated over
the whole number of trials of each Monte–Carlo trials run (correct detection), true negative (TN) represents the number
of trials which are correctly recognized as normal operating conditions, false negative (FN) denotes the number of trials
during which actual faulty operating conditions are incorrectly recognized as normal ones (missed detection or incorrect
isolation), and false positive (FP) represents to the number of actual normal conditions which are incorrectly recognized
as faulty ones (false alarm).
Each table reports the FDI performance results regarding a specific actual fault condition, ie, actuator fault 𝑓M2 (Tables 2
and 3), sensor fault 𝑓𝜔rw,2 (Table 4), or fault-free condition (Table 5). Different standard deviation values have been imple-
mented for the normal distributions of the parameters. Moreover, the number of trials for each test configuration and the
numbers of TP, TN, FP, and FN are reported along with the sensitivity, specificity, and accuracy parameters.
For each performance index and counter, 2 different values are given in each table and uncertainty condition. The
first one regards the number of TP, TN, FP, or FN and the resulting TPR, SPC, and ACC obtained taking into exam the
diagnostic signals for the detection and isolation of a hypothetical fault 𝑓M2 , the second one regards the signals taken into
exam for the detection and isolation of a hypothetical fault 𝑓𝜔rw,2 .
Remark 11. The robustness analysis has been performed only for actuator faults 𝑓Mi (i=1,… ,4) and flywheel spin rate
sensor faults 𝑓𝜔rw,𝑗 (j=1,… ,4). In fact, it is worth noting that the models of the AOs exploited for the FDD of satellite
angular velocity and attitude sensor faults fq,k (k=1,2) and 𝑓𝜔l (l=1,… ,3) are actually functions only of the state
variables and no other uncertain or time-varying parameters are involved. Therefore, these AOs and the diagnosis of
the related faults are automatically robust to any parameter uncertainty.
TABLE 2 Robustness analysis for the FDI of hypothetical faults 𝑓M2 and 𝑓𝜔rw,2 in case of actual fault 𝑓M2 w.r.t. parametric
uncertainties (percent standard deviations w.r.t. nominal values) without attitude change manoeuvre
f M𝟐 Trials TPM2 TNM2 FNM2 FPM2 TPRM2 SPCM2 ACCM2 TP𝝎2 TN𝝎2 FN𝝎2 FP𝝎2 TPR𝝎2 SPC𝝎2 ACC𝝎2
𝜇 100 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
𝜌 100 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
CD ∶ 𝜎 = 2% 100 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
CD ∶ 𝜎 = 5% 100 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
CD ∶ 𝜎 = 10% 100 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
rcp ∶ 𝜎 = 3% 100 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
rcp ∶ 𝜎 = 5% 100 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
rcp ∶ 𝜎 = 10% 100 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
Isat ∶ 𝜎 = 1% 100 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
Isat ∶ 𝜎 = 2% 100 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
Isat ∶ 𝜎 = 5% 100 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
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TABLE 3 Robustness analysis for the FDI of hypothetical faults 𝑓M2 and 𝑓𝜔rw,2 in case of actual fault 𝑓M2 w.r.t. parametric
uncertainties (percent standard deviations w.r.t. nominal values) with attitude change manoeuvre
f M𝟐 Trials TPM2 TNM2 FNM2 FPM2 TPRM2 SPCM2 ACCM2 TP𝝎2 TN𝝎2 FN𝝎2 FP𝝎2 TPR𝝎2 SPC𝝎2 ACC𝝎2
Isat ∶ 𝜎 = 1% 100 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
Isat ∶ 𝜎 = 2% 100 98 0 2 0 0.98 — 0.98 0 98 0 2 — 0.98 0.98
Isat ∶ 𝜎 = 5% 100 56 0 44 0 0.56 — 0.56 0 56 0 44 — 0.56 0.56
TABLE 4 Robustness analysis for the FDI of hypothetical faults 𝑓M2 and 𝑓𝜔rw,2 in case of actual fault 𝑓𝜔rw,2 w.r.t. parametric
uncertainties, both with and without attitude change manoeuvre
f
𝝎rw,𝟐
Trials TPM2 TNM2 FNM2 FPM2 TPRM2 SPCM2 ACCM2 TP𝝎2 TN𝝎2 FN𝝎2 FP𝝎2 TPR𝝎2 SPC𝝎2 ACC𝝎2
𝜇 100 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00
𝜌 100 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00
CD ∶ 𝜎 = 2% 100 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00
CD ∶ 𝜎 = 5% 100 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00
CD ∶ 𝜎 = 10% 100 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00
rcp ∶ 𝜎 = 3% 100 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00
rcp ∶ 𝜎 = 5% 100 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00
rcp ∶ 𝜎 = 10% 100 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00
Isat ∶ 𝜎 = 1% 100 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00
Isat ∶ 𝜎 = 2% 100 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00
Isat ∶ 𝜎 = 5% 100 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00 100 0 0 0 1.00 — 1.00
TABLE 5 Robustness analysis for the FDI of hypothetical faults 𝑓M2 and 𝑓𝜔rw,2 in case of actual fault-free condition w.r.t.
parametric uncertainties, both with and without attitude change manoeuvre
Fault–free Trials TPM2 TNM2 FNM2 FPM2 TPRM2 SPCM2 ACCM2 TP𝝎2 TN𝝎2 FN𝝎2 FP𝝎2 TPR𝝎2 SPC𝝎2 ACC𝝎2
𝜇 100 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
𝜌 100 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
CD ∶ 𝜎 = 2% 100 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
CD ∶ 𝜎 = 5% 100 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
CD ∶ 𝜎 = 10% 100 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
rcp ∶ 𝜎 = 3% 100 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
rcp ∶ 𝜎 = 5% 100 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
rcp ∶ 𝜎 = 10% 100 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
Isat ∶ 𝜎 = 1% 100 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
Isat ∶ 𝜎 = 2% 100 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
Isat ∶ 𝜎 = 5% 100 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00 0 100 0 0 — 1.00 1.00
As it can be seen from the Tables 2 to 5, both in stationary attitude and manoeuvre conditions, the proposed detec-
tion and isolation scheme results to be robust to several parameter uncertainties also in case of quite high uncertainty
standard deviations. In particular, since the aerodynamic disturbance is analytically decoupled in the observer and filter
models, the corresponding diagnostic signals result to be completely independent from any uncertainty affecting the drag
coefficient and air density values. Moreover, the effect of the uncertainty affecting the gravitational constant, with the
considered bound limits based on realistic values related to the Earth gravitational field, results to be actually negligible.
The considered realistic and very narrow experimental bounds of the gravitational parameter confirm the assumption of
a gravitational disturbance model almost perfectly known.
Finally, the proposed scheme results to be generally robust also to uncertainties affecting the knowledge of the satellite
moments of inertia and aerodynamic displacement vector rcp. Just in case of actual actuator fault and in the manouvre
condition, it can be seen that some missed detections and isolations or false alarms can occur due to the presence uncer-
tainty affecting the knowledge of the satellite moments of inertia, mainly due to the modulation and amplification of the
model error related to the parametric uncertainty by the satellite angular velocity values associated to the manoeuvre. In
this situation, the uncertainty leads to a misleading recognition of the occurred fault type on the basis of the obtained
additional diagnostic signal 𝜉9 given by the additional NLGA residual filter.
Therefore, the accurate knowledge of the satellite moments of inertia results to be the most critical aspect regarding
the robustness and reliability of the proposed FDI scheme in case of actual actuator faults. However, it can be seen that
the obtained isolation error consists essentially in the wrong classification of the actual type of an occurring actual fault,
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due to the structure of the exploited decision logic scheme. In the absence of any actuator or sensor fault or in case of
flywheel spin rate sensor faults, the proposed scheme allows to obtain the correct fault rejection or isolation even in case
of manoeuvre and inertial parameter uncertainties.
8 CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a novel practical scheme for diagnosis of actuator and sensor faults that affect the ADCS of an
LEO satellite. An SA was exploited to qualitatively assess the detectability and isolability of defects in the ADCS. This
analysis showed that partial hardware sensor redundancy is required to achieve complete isolation of all possible sensor
faults. The proposed diagnosis algorithmexploited fault estimates provided byAOs as diagnostic signals, and a generalised
estimation filter design was obtained using an approach based on an augmented spacecraft. Aerodynamic disturbance
decoupling was achieved using the NLGA. The use of adaptive fault estimation filters allowed to estimate generic fault
functions without needing any a priori information about fault internal models. Simulation results served to assess the
effectiveness of the proposed diagnosis scheme and verified that the method is able to achieve quick and correct FDI and
also provide accurate fault estimates. A robustness and reliability analysis with respect to system parameter uncertainties
and disturbances verified very satisfactory performances of the proposed fault diagnosis scheme. Further developments
could concern the integration of the proposed scheme in an active fault-tolerant control system.
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